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Ancillary Jurisdiction: Plaintiffs' Claims Against
Nondiverse Third-Party Defendants
PamelaJ. Stephens*
INTRODUCTION

Ancillary jurisdiction in federal courts is that doctrine which
permits the addition of parties or claims to litigation when the
claims by or against such parties would not, standing alone,
support federal jurisdiction.1 The concept of ancillary jurisdiction rests upon the assumption that in acquiring federal subject
matter jurisdiction over a particular "case," a district court also
acquires jurisdiction over the entire "controversy," including
those matters which may be considered ancillary to the claim
2
upon which the original action is based.
The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction, recognized by the Supreme
Court as early as 1860 in Freeman v. Howe, 3 originally was
limited to situations in which its assertion was necessary if the
federal courts were to function effectively as courts. In 1926, the
Supreme Court set forth the modern view of ancillary jurisdiction in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange,4 which held that a
compulsory counterclaim based on state law was within the
ancillary jurisdiction of the federal district court. For more than
fifty years after its decision in Moore, the Supreme Court
remained silent with regard to ancillary jurisdiction and its limits, leaving the lower courts to develop the doctrine. In the interim, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted.5 Liberal
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1. See Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798, 810 (2d Cir. 1979);
Eikel v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 473 F.2d 959, 964-65 (5th Cir. 1973); Revere Copper &
Brass, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 712 (5th Cir. 1970).
2. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna RR., 438 F.2d 62, 65 (3d
Cir. 1971); Morrow v. District of Columbia, 417 F.2d 728, 737-38 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
3. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860). See generally Note, The Ancillary Concept and the
FederalRules, 64 HARV. L Rv. 968 (1951).
4. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
5. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in 1938 and amended several
times from 1939 to 1971. See 308 U.S. 645 (1939); 308 U.S. 642 (1939); 329 U.S. 839 (1947);
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joinder provisions contained in the rules greatly increased the
instances in which ancillary jurisdiction might be invoked in
federal court.
This article will trace the historical development of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. It will consider how the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, particulary rule 14, have influenced
that development and will analyze the Supreme Court's current
position on ancillary jurisdiction. More specifically, the article
will analyze plaintiffs' claims against nondiverse third-party
defendants and offer suggestions on how ancillary jurisdiction
over such claims might develop so as to coincide with its underlying principles and the expressed concerns of the Supreme
Court.
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ANCILLARY JURISDICTION
Ancillary JurisdictionPriorto the FederalRules
The federal district courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,
limited by both the Constitution 6 and congressional acts. 7 These
limits have imposed upon the courts the difficult task of affording complete relief to parties properly before them, while taking
care not to exceed the scope of their power and authority to
adjudicate. The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction developed as a
method of resolving that conflict in certain cases. It was originally invoked in cases involving the courts' exercise of jurisdiction over property interests. In Freeman v. Howe,8 for instance,
a United States marshall, complying with a writ issued by a federal court in Massachusetts, seized several railroad cars. After
the seizure, mortgagees of the railroad cars initiated a state court
replevin action against the marshall. The mortgagees were not
parties to the federal suit. 9 The Court held that where a federal
court had jurisdiction over particular property, it had the power
to decide all questions relating to that property, even those arising under state law. 10 The state replevin action was thus barred.
The Court rejected the mortgagees' argument that if they could

335 U.S. 919 (1949); 341 U.S. 959 (1951); 368 U.S. 1009 (1961); 374 U.S. 861 (1963); 383 U.S.
1029 (1966); 389 U.S. 1121 (1968); 398 U.S. 977 (1970); 401 U.S. 1017 (1971).
6. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
7. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332 (1976).
8. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1860).
9. Id. at 453.
10. Id. at 457.
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not bring their replevin action in state court, the lack of diversity
of citizenship between the parties would leave them remediless.
The Court found instead that since federal subject matter jurisdiction existed over the original suit, the mortgagees could have
filed a bill in equity in federal court to restrain the law court's
judgment without meeting diversity requirements.1 1 Such bill,
the Court stated, was "not an original suit, but ancillary and
' 12
dependent... to the original suit.
In keeping with Freeman, the early cases limited the uses of
ancillary jurisdiction to certain "necessary" instances.1 3 The
Supreme Court itself said as late as 1925 that "no controversy
can be regarded as dependent or ancillary unless it has direct
relation to property or assets actually or constructively drawn
1 4
into the court's possession or control by the principal suit."
There were a few early cases, however, which made more expansive use of the doctrine by applying it to protect or enhance the
court's jurisdiction over the principal claim. 15
In 1926, the Supreme Court decided Moore v. New York Cotton
Exchange, 6 a case which greatly expanded the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction. In Moore, the plaintiffs claim was properly brought in federal court because it alleged a violation of federal antitrust laws arising out of the defendant's alleged monopoly of the sale and transportation of cotton in interstate commerce. Western Union, a non-party to the suit, had agreed to
telegraph price quotations to firms approved by the defendant
Exchange. When the defendant refused to allow the quotations
to go to the plaintiff, thus blocking its ability to do business, the
plaintiff sued.' 7 The defendant then filed a counterclaim seeking
an injunction, on state law grounds, against the plaintiffs further

11. Id. at 460.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Wabash R.R. v. Adelbert College, 208 U.S. 38 (1908) (court with competent jurisdiction taking possession of property withdraws jurisdiction from all other
courts on issues relating to the property); In re Tyler, 149 U.S. 164 (1893) (state tax liability for property in possession of federal court will be decided by that court).
14. Fulton Nat'l Bank v. Hozier, 267 U.S. 276, 280 (1925).
15. See, e.g., Dewey v. West Fairmont Gas Coal Co., 123 U.S. 329 (1887) (where court
had jurisdiction over diverse plaintiff creditor and defendant debtor, court acquired jurisdiction over defendant's nondiverse transferee in action by creditor to set aside debtor's
fraudulent conveyance); accord Partridge v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 82 U.S. (15 Wall.)
573 (1872) (where court has jurisdiction over parties on contract action, court also has
jurisdiction over defendant's set-off claim).
16. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
17. Id. at 596.
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"purloining" of the quotations.1 8 Under the Federal Equity Rules
of 1912,19 the counterclaim was compulsory because it arose out
of the same transaction as the plaintiffs claim, even though it
did not involve a federal question. The district court in Moore
dismissed the plaintiffs complaint, but awarded the defendant
the relief sought under the counterclaim. 20 In affirming the district court's actions, the Supreme Court held that the claim and
counterclaim were so closely connected "that the failure of the
former [established] a foundation for the latter" and that com21
plete relief could not obtain without the issuance of an injunction.
Thus, without mentioning ancillary jurisdiction, the Court in
effect expanded the doctrine to cover compulsory counterclaims,
22
regardless of the existence of property before the court.
In addition to the question of jurisdiction over related claims,
the federal courts are also faced with the question of jurisdiction
over related parties. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, federal courts followed state procedures in legal
23
actions and Federal Equity Rules in equitable actions. Impleader, the practice whereby a defendant may bring into a lawsuit a third party who is or may be liable to the defendant on the
claim being asserted by the original plaintiff, was thus available
in federal court only in those instances where state law or the
24
equity rules so provided.
Unlike the expansion of ancillary jurisdiction over compulsory
counterclaims reflected in Moore and later cases, 25 the use of
federal impleader had no comparable development. Rather, in
the few instances in which impleader was invoked in the federal

18. Id. at 610.
19. Id. at 609. The rules referred to were the first comprehensive code of federal equity
adopted by the Supreme Court as the Equity Rules of 1912, 226 U.S. 627 (1912). The
particular rule at issue in Moore was Federal Equity Rule 30 which provided in part: "The
answer must state in short and simple form any counter-claim arising out of the transaction which is the subject matter of the suit .. " 270 U.S. at 609.
20. 270 U.S. at 609.
21. Id.
22. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3523 (ancillary jurisdiction) [hereinafter cited as WRIGHT]; Fraser, Ancillary
Jurisdictionand the Joinder of Claims in the Federal Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27 (1964); Note,
Ancillary Jurisdictionof the FederalCourts, 48 IOWA L. REV. 383 (1963).
23. See Holtzoff, Some Problems Under Federal Third-PartyPractice,3 LA. L. REV. 408
(1941).

24. Id. at 408-09.
25. See, e.g., Kaumagraph Co. v. General Trade Mark Corp., 12 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y.
1935); Chernow v. Cohn & Rosenberger, Inc., 5 F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1934).
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courts under state law, the courts held that the third-party complaint involved a separate controversy, necessitating an independent basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction. 26 That federal subject matter jurisdiction existed over the original claim
was not considered a sufficient basis for ancillary jurisdiction
over the third-party complaint, despite the obvious dependence of
the latter upon the former.
Pendent JurisdictionPriorto the FederalRules
Another influence in the development of ancillary jurisdiction
in the federal courts involves the related doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction. While both doctrines govern the federal courts asserting jurisdiction over matters which standing alone would not
support federal jurisdiction, pendent jurisdiction is usually distinguished as permitting a state law claim to be added to an
original action based on a federal question. 27 In general, pendent jurisdiction applies only to the assertion of related state
claims by the original plaintiff against the original defendant. 28
Pendent jurisdiction had its roots in the 1824 case of Osborne
v. Bank of the United States,29 in which Chief Justice Marshall
stated:
We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial
power of the Union is extended by the constitution, forms
an ingredient of the original cause, it is in the power of
Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that
cause, although other questions of fact or of law may be
involved in it.30
The modern rule of pendent jurisdiction can be traced to Hurn
v. Oursler,31 a case involving both a federal copyright infringe-

26. See, e.g., Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. v. Hall, 70 F.2d 608 (5th Cir.
1934); Sperry v. Keeler Transp. Line, Inc., 28 F. 2d 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1928); Wilson v. United
Am. Lines, Inc., 21 F.2d 872 (S.D.N.Y. 1927).
27. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725(1966).
28. See Federman v. Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 597 F.2d 798, 810 (2d Cir. 1979);
Goldberg, The Influence of ProceduralRules on FederalJurisdiction,28 STAN. L REv. 395,
416 n.115 (1976); Comment, Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Towards a Synthesis of
Two Doctrines, 22 UCLA L. REv. 1263 (1975).
29. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). In Osborne,the Court held the Bank of the United
States could sue and was subject to suit in the federal courts. Jurisdiction existed under
art. HI, § 2 even though questions of fact were present in the case.
30. Id. at 823.
31. 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
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ment claim and a state claim based on unfair competition.3 2 The
district court dismissed the state claim for lack of jurisdiction but
decided the federal claim. The Supreme Court held that the district court should have decided both claims since the state claim
was "inseparable from the statutory wrong." 33 The Court found
that federal courts had jurisdiction when "two distinct grounds
in support of a single cause of action are alleged, one only of
which presents a federal question." 34 Underlying this assertion
of jurisdiction was the policy of promoting judicial economy and
convenience.3 5 The difficulty in applying Hum, which arose
from the "single cause of action" requirement, resulted in a restrictive development of "pendent jurisdiction" in the lower
courts.

36

By defining "single cause of action" as those claims

proved by "substantially identical" facts, the courts excluded all
but the most closely related claims.37
Merger of Pendent and Ancillary JurisdictionFollowing
Adoption of the FederalRules
Following the enactment of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,38 two clear trends emerged. First, the tests for
ancillary and pendent jurisdiction became more inclusive,39 and
second, they began to merge into one standard applicable in
both pendent and ancillary jurisdiction cases. 40 Although Fed-

32. Id.
33.
34.

Id. at 242.
Id. at 246.

35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1961) (rescission of election by proxies not a single cause of action when combined with a federal

claim for fraudulent solicitation of such proxies); United Indus. Corp. v. Nuclear Corp. of
Am., 237 F. Supp. 971 (D. Del. 1964) (where court had jurisdiction over securities fraud
allegations arising out of a contract, the court did not have pendent jurisdiction for
breach of other clauses in same contract). The narrow result of Hurn was codified in 1948
in 28 U.S.C. § 1338(b) which provided that: '"he district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a claim of unfair competition when joined with a
substantial and related claim under the copyright, patent, plant variety protection or
trade-mark laws."
37. Dann v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 288 F.2d 201, 215 (6th Cir. 1961).
38. 308 U.S. 645 (1938).
39. For example, prior to 1938 impleader actions were generally held to require an
independent basis of jurisdiction. After enactment of rule 14, however, courts have generally applied ancillary jurisdiction to such claims. See infra notes 90-96 and accompanying text; see also Goldberg, supra note 28, at 416-28.
40. See generally Comment, supra note 28.
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eral Rule of Civil Procedure 82 provides that "these rules shall
not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of the United
States district courts . . .,"41 the use of ancillary and pendent
jurisdiction has increased under the federal rules due to "the flexible devices for joinder of parties and claims that the rules provide." 42 The joinder provisions permit more opportunities for
invoking the doctrines than previously existed, enabling the
courts to "apply pre-existing jurisdictional concepts to new sets
43
of circumstances."
As with ancillary jurisdiction, the test for pendent jurisdiction
has undergone a transformation in the post-rules period. In 1966,
the Supreme Court reconsidered the restrictive rule developed by
the lower courts after Hurn in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs.44
In Gibbs, the plaintiff contended that local union members had
prevented the opening of a mine, thereby interfering with his
contracts to haul coal and act as a superintendent of the mine.
Gibbs' suit asserted the federal claim that he was a victim of a
secondary boycott in violation of section 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 and a state law claim that the
defendant union had unlawfully conspired to interfere with his
haulage and employment contracts. 45
In determining that the district court had jurisdiction to hear
the state claim, the Court abandoned the "single cause of action"
test of Hurn. Instead, the Court noted that since Hurn had been
decided before the adoption of the federal rules, and since the
rules strongly encouraged the joinder of parties and claims, a
more liberal test was appropriate. 46 The Gibbs Court concluded,
therefore, that pendent jurisdiction exists when the federal and
state claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,"
the federal claim is substantial, and the plaintiff would ordinarily be expected to try all of his claims in one proceeding. 47 The

41. FED. R. CIV. P. 82. See also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,
370 (1978) ("[Ilt is axiomatic that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create or
withdraw federal jurisdiction.").
42. Goldberg, supra note 28, at 417. Professor Goldberg takes the position that the
rules have in fact expanded the jurisdictional tests used.
43. Id. "The new joinder devices simply enabled courts to apply preexisting jurisdictional concepts to new sets of circumstances ....In other words, the broader jurisdiction
existed before the Federal Rules; it just had not been needed or used." Id.
44. 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 724.
47. Id. at 725.
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Court stated, however, that whether the power to hear the related
claim would be exercised remained within the court's discretion.
The court could decide not to assert jurisdiction where judicial
48
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants so warranted.
Elimination of the Hum "single cause of action" test,49 to

which ancillary claims had never been subject, and substitution
of a test centered on a "claim" under the federal rules contributed
to an erosion of the distinctions between the ancillary and pendent jurisdictional tests. 50 Following Gibbs, the lower courts
extended the notion of pendent jurisdiction to diversity cases and
to cases involving a third party against whom a state claim was
asserted.5 1 In the context of a "pendent party" case, the Supreme
Court itself commented that "there is little profit in attempting to
decide... whether there are any 'principled' differences between
52
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction."
Finally, in 1978, the Supreme Court decided its first ancillary
jurisdiction case since Moore,53 and in so doing not only blurred
the remaining distinctions between ancillary and pendent jurisdictions, but seemed to call a halt to the fifty-year expansion of
those doctrines.
PRESENT DAY ANCILLARY JURISDICTION:
OWEN EQUIPMENT& ERECTION Co. v. KROGER

In Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger,5 4 the plaintiff,
a citizen of Iowa, sued the Omaha Public Power District (OPPD),
a Nebraska corporation, in a federal diversity action, claiming

48. Id. at 726.
49. Ancillary claims were never subject to the Hurn "single cause of action" test.
50. Fairness had always been an important aspect of the ancillary jurisdiction doctrine, since it was usually raised by a party in court against his will who might otherwise
lose his opportunity to raise his claim. Gibbs expressly made fairness relevant to the

pendent jurisdiction decision, albeit in the discretionary phase, so that both jurisdictional
determinations after Gibbs must consider judicial economy, convenience and fairness.
See Comment, supra note 28, at 1273.
51.

See, e.g., Leather's Best, Inc. v. S.S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1971)

(pendent party); Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap, Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971)
(pendent party); Stone v. Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1000
(1972)(diversity); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Craton, 405 F.2d 41 (5th Cir.
1968) (diversity); Jacobson v. Atlantic City Hosp., 392 F.2d 149 (3d Cir. 1968) (diversity).
But see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (disallowing a pendent party claim).
52. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 13 (1976).
53. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
54. 437 U.S. 365 (1978).
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that OPPD's negligent operation of a power line caused the electrocution death of her husband. OPPD filed a third-party complaint under federal rule 14(a) against Owen Equipment and
Erection Co. (Owen), alleging that Owen's negligence had in fact
been the proximate cause of Kroger's death. OPPD subsequently
moved for summary judgment and while that motion was pending, plaintiff was granted leave to file an amended complaint
naming Owen as an additional defendant. The district court
granted OPPD's motion for summary judgment and the case
went to trial between the plaintiff and Owen, the third-party
55
defendant.
When the trial commenced, it appeared that the district court
had jurisdiction over the case on the basis of diversity of citizenship, since plaintiff had alleged and Owen had admitted in its
answer that Owen was "a Nebraska corporation with its principal place of business in Nebraska." 56 But after the trial began it
was determined that Owen's principal place of business was
actually in Iowa, not Nebraska, and thus complete diversity did
not exist between the plaintiff and Owen.5 7 Owen moved for

dismissal, a motion ultimately denied by the district court, which
entered judgment on the jury's verdict for plaintiff.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court
judgment,58 holding that under United Mine Workers u. Gibbs,
the court had the power to take jurisdiction over the plaintiffs
claim because it arose from the "core of 'operative facts' giving
rise to both [plaintiffs] claim against OPPD and OPPD's claim
against Owen." 59 Moreover, the court of appeals held that the
district court had properly exercised its discretion to decide the
case in light of the fact that Owen had concealed its true
60
citizenship.
In its review of the Eighth Circuit decision, the Supreme Court
noted that while federal rule 14(a) permits a plaintiff to file a
claim against a third-party defendant, it does not indicate
whether such a claim requires an independent basis of federal
jurisdiction. 61 After asserting, once again, that the federal rules

55. Id. at 367-68.
56. Id. at 368.
57. Id.
58. 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977).
59. Id. at 424.
60. Id. at 417.
61. 437 U.S. at 370.
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neither create nor withdraw federal jurisdiction, 2 the Court considered whether the Eighth Circuit was correct in relying on
Gibbs to define the constitutional limits of ancillary jurisdiction.
The Court acknowledged that although Gibbs was, strictly
speaking, a pendent jurisdiction case, it posed the same question
as Kroger: "Under what circumstances may a federal court hear
and decide a state-law claim arising between citizens of the same
63
State?"
In fashioning a response to that question, the Court examined
the statutory as well as the constitutional limits of federal court
jurisdiction. It was true that the "common nucleus of operative
fact" test of Gibbs delineated constitutionally permissible federal
jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.6 4 But it was also
true, the Court stated, that Congress had limited diversity jurisdiction even further.65 In its general diversity jurisdiction statute, Congress conferred upon federal district courts jurisdiction
over "all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds
the sum or value of $10,000 . . . and is between . . . citizens of
different States .... ,,6As the Court pointed out, this jurisdic-

tional grant has been held consistently to require complete diversity; that is, each defendant must be a citizen of a state different
from that of each plaintiff.67 Accordingly, the Kroger Court
determined that since the plaintiff could not have originally
brought suit against OPPD and Owen as codefendants, she
should not be able to achieve the same result simply because
Owen was initially brought into the suit by a third-party complaint.68 To allow her to do so would allow her to "defeat the
statutory requirement of complete diversity by the simple expedient of suing only those defendants who were of diverse citizen6' 9
ship and waiting for them to implead nondiverse defendants.
The Court acknowledged that ancillary jurisdiction over nondiverse parties had often been upheld in situations involving
impleader, cross-claims or counterclaims, but distinguished those

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

(citing FED. R. Civ. P. 82).
at 370.
at 371-72.
at 372.

66. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1) (1976).
67. 437 U.S. at 373 (citing, inter alia, Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267
(1806)).
68. Id. at 375.
69. Id. at 374.
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429

cases from the situation at hand. 70 In Kroger, the Court found,
the nonfederal claim was not ancillary to the federal claim in the
same way that the defendant's claim against a third-party always
is.71 Whereas a third-party complaint manifests a logical dependence on the resolution of the primary lawsuit, 72 the plaintiffs
73
claim in Kroger was new and independent of the main claim.
In addition, the plaintiff in Kroger voluntarily chose to assert a
state-law claim in a federal court. 74 That differed, the Court
stated, from typical ancillary jurisdiction cases which involve
claims by a defendant appearing involuntarily before the court,
or by one whose rights would be lost unless asserted in the ongoing federal suit.75 Finally, while recognizing the seeming contradiction in its treatment of the Kroger claim and other multiparty claims, the Court declared that the practical considerations
attending ancillary jurisdiction are not sufficient to extend the
doctrine "to a plaintiffs cause of action against a citizen of the
76
same State in a diversity case."
Justice White's dissent, joined by Justice Brennan, contended
that there was no support for the majority's opinion in either the
Constitution or any federal statute. 77 The majority had relied
70. Id. at 375 (citing, inter alia, Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926))
(counterclaims); LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414
F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1969); H.L. Peterson Co. v. Applewhite, 383 F.2d 430 (5th Cir. 1967)
(impleader).
71. 437 U.S. at 376. The federal claim was a wrongful death action against a diverse
defendant. The nonfederal claim was also for wrongful death but against a nondiverse
defendant.
72 Id. "Under Rule 14(a), a third-party defendant may not be impleaded merely
because he may be liable to the plaintiff." 437 U.S. at 368 n.3 (emphasis in original). See
also Advisory Committee's Notes on 1946 Amendment to Rule 14, 28 U.S.C. App. Rule 14
(1976 & Supp. V 1981).
73. 437 U.S. at 376.
74. Id. See also Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890, 894 (4th Cir.
1972) ("IThe efficiency plaintiff seeks so avidly is available without question in the state
courts.").
75. 437 U.S. at 376.
76. Id. at 377. The Court states:
It is not unreasonable to assume that, in generally requiring complete diversity, Congress did not intend to confine the jurisdiction of federal courts so
inflexibly that they are unable to protect legal rights or effectively to resolve an
entire, logically entwined lawsuit. Those practical needs are the basis of the
doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. But neither the convenience of litigants nor
considerations of judicial economy can suffice to justify extension of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction to a plaintiff's cause of action against a citizen of
the same State in a diversity case.
Id.
77. Id. at 378 (White, J., dissenting).
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heavily on Aldinger v. Howard78 to support its view that statutory limits constrained the district court from asserting jurisdiction over Mrs. Kroger's claim. The dissent, however, distinguished
Aldinger. In that case, the plaintiffs state claim against a
county was closely connected with the federal civil rights claim
against a county officer, 79 yet the Court held there was no pendent jurisdiction over the state claim because Congress had
intended not to bestow on federal courts jurisdiction over state
based civil rights claims against cities and counties.80
In Kroger, no such specific congressional intent was ascertainable from the complete diversity requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1332.
Moreover, as the dissent pointed out, Aldinger was concerned
with the plaintiffs attempted joinder of a party who was not
otherwise a proper party to the lawsuit. Mrs. Kroger, on the other
hand, "merely sought to assert against Owen a claim arising out
of the same transaction that was already before the court."8' Because of the distinctions between Aldinger's pendent party claim
and the plaintiffs claim against Owen, the dissent urged a rule
that would allow the district court to exercise its discretion in
retaining such a claim based on considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness.8 2
CURRENT PRACTICE AFrER KROGER

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14(a), which provides for thirdparty practice in the federal courts, authorizes several different

78. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). Aldinger is no longer good law insofar as political subdivisions
have since been held amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). See

Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). However, Aldinger's
jurisdictional standard is still valid. 437 U.S. at 373.
79. The plaintiff filed his federal claim alleging a violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976
& Supp. IV 1980).
80. 427 U.S. at 16 (citing Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-91 (1961) and Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511-13 (1973)). Thus, the Court refused to allow the "federal courts to
fashion a jurisdictional doctrine under the general language of Art. III enabling them to
circumvent this exclusion.... Id.
81. Kroger, 437i U.S. at 381.
82. Id. at 382. The dissent correctly points out that the Aldinger decision was
expressly made a narrow one by the Court:
There are, of course, many variations in the language which Congress has
employed to confer jurisdiction upon the federal courts, and we decide here only
the issue of so-called "pendent party" jurisdiction with respect to a claim
brought under §§ 1343(3) and 1983. Other statutory grants and other alignments of parties and claims might call for a different result.
427 U.S. at 18.
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claims in the context of that practice. 83 First, a defending party
is authorized to cause a summons and complaint to be served
upon a person who is not a party to the action and who, the
defending party alleges, is or may be liable for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim.8 4 Second, the third-party plaintiff may assert
any counterclaims or cross-claims against the third-party plaintiff
and other third-party defendants respectively.85 Third, the thirdparty defendant is allowed to bring claims which arise out of the
86
subject matter of the principal claim against the original plaintiff.
Fourth, the plaintiff may assert any claims which arise out of
the subject matter of the principal claim against the third-party
defendant.87 As illustrated by Kroger, simply finding that a
claim fits within one of the authorized categories does not answer
the question of whether a federal district court should retain
jurisdiction over such a claim when it lacks an independent
basis of federal subject matter jurisdiction. 8 Each of these
authorized claims must therefore be considered in light of Kroger,
the traditional ancillary jurisdiction doctrine, and recent interpretations of such claims.
OriginalDefendant v. Third-PartyDefendant
Although pre-rule case law required that third-party claims
89
independently satisfy the federal jurisdictional requirements,

83. See FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
84. FED. R. Civ. R. 14(a) provides in part: "[A] defending party, as a third party plaintiff, may cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party to the
action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiffs claim against him."
85. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides in part: "[TIhe third-party defendant shall make his
defenses to the third-party plaintiffs claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims
against the third-party plaintiff and cross-claims against other third-party defendants as
provided in Rule 13."
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides in part: "The third-party defendant may ... assert
any claim against the plaintiff arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the plaintiffs claim against the third party plaintiff."
87. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides in part:
The plaintiff may assert any claim against the third-party defendant arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs
claim against the third-party plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon
shall assert his defenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims and
cross-claims as provided in Rule 13.
88. 437 U.S. at 370.
89. See, e.g., Galveston, Harrisburg & San Antonio Ry. v. Hall, 70 F.2d 608 (5th Cir.
1934); Lowry & Co. v. National City Bank, 28 F.2d 895 (S.D.N.Y. 1928).
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following the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a
vast majority of courts held that ancillary jurisdiction existed
over third-party claims allowed under rule 14.90 In the wake of
the Supreme Court's decision in Kroger, however, ,several courts
have reconsidered that firmly entrenched rule. For example, a
district court in Pennsylvania was presented with the argument
that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action might sue a
diverse "nonhealth care defendant" on the assumption that the
defendant would join the nondiverse doctor and hospital. 91 Thus,
the plaintiff could defeat the general diversity statute and get its
entire case into federal court. In line with the Supreme Court's
statement in Kroger that "[i]t is not unreasonable to assume
that, in generally requiring complete diversity, Congress did not
intend to confine the jurisdiction of federal courts so inflexibly
that they are unable to protect legal rights or effectively to
resolve an entire, logically entwined lawsuit.. .,"92 courts faced
with this argument have continued to find ancillary jurisdiction
applicable to a defendant's claim against a third-party defendant,
with one major factual exception. 93 Federal rule 18 allows a
party in the position of a third-party plaintiff to join all claims
which he may have against a third-party defendant. 94 There is
no requirement in rule 18 that these claims be related to each
other or to the transaction or occurrence which is the subject
matter of plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff. 95 As
a general rule, however, courts have found that ancillary jurisdiction does not support the assertion of federal subject matter

90. See, e.g., Schram v. Roney, 30 F. Supp. 458 (E.D. Mich. 1939); Morrell v. United Air
Lines Transp. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 757 (S.D.N.Y. 1939); Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp.
Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112 (D.C. Conn. 1939); Crum v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 29 F.
Supp. 90 (S.D.W. Va. 1939); Bossard v. McGwinn, 27 F. Supp. 412 (W.D. Pa. 1939).
91. See, e.g., Firich v. American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 1043 (W.D. Pa.
1980); see also Curtis v. Radiation Dynamics, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1176 (D.C. Md. 1981);
Ross, Stebbins, Inc. v. Slomowitz, No. 79 Civ. 3987 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1980).
92. 437 U.S. at 377. Moreover, the Court mentioned with seeming approval the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction in the basic impleader situation. Id. at 375.
93.

See, e.g., Curtis v. Radiation Dynamics, Inc., 515 F. Supp. 1176 (D.C. Md. 1981);

Ross, Stebbins, Inc. v. Slomowitz, No. 79 Civ. 3987 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 18, 1980); Firich v.
American Cystoscope Makers, Inc., 482 F. Supp. 1043 (W.D. Pa. 1980).
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) provides: "A party asserting a claim to relief as an original
claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, may join either as independent or
as alternate claims, as many claims, legal, equitable, or maritime, as he has against an
opposing party." See 6 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1582
(1971).
95. See C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 94, § 1582.
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96
jurisdiction over such joined claims.

Third-PartyDefendant v. Third-PartyPlaintiff
Rule 14(a) provides that a third-party defendant who asserts
counterclaims against a third-party plaintiff and cross-claims
against other third-party defendants shall do so as provided in
rule 13.97 Thus, in determining whether or not it has ancillary
jurisdiction over such claims, the court must examine case law
interpretations of the various provisions of rule 13.98
Since Moore v.New York Cotton Exchange,99 federal courts
have asserted ancillary jurisdiction over counterclaims which
arise out of the transaction that is the subject matter of the main
suit. 100 The Court in Moore broadly defined "transaction" to be a
"word of flexible meaning," which may consist of many occurrences logically if not immediately connected. 10 1 In drafting the
federal rules, the advisory committee adopted this notion of
"transaction"'1 2 and devised a scheme categorizing counterclaims
as either "compulsory" or "permissive."' 1 3 Compulsory counterclaims are those arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim, 0 4 which
must be raised in the original suit or be forever barred. 10 5 Per-

96. See, e.g., Gebhardt v. Edgar, 251 F. Supp. 678 (W.D. Pa. 1966); C.W. Humphrey Co.
v. Security Aluminum Co., 31 F.R.D. 41 (E.D. Mich. 1962); United States v. Scott, 18
F.R.D. 324 (S.D.N.Y. 1955). But see Schwab v. Erie Lackawanna R.R., 438 F.2d 62 (3d Cir.
1971); Noland Co. v. Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., 301 F.2d 43 (4th Cir. 1962).
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a) provides in relevant part: "The person served with the summons and third-party complaint ...shall make his defenses to the third-party plaintiffs
claim as provided in Rule 12 and his counterclaims against the third-party plaintiff and
cross-claims against other third-party defendants as provided in Rule 13."
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 13; see, e.g., Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926)
(counterclaims); LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414
F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1969) (cross-claims); Scott v. Fancher, 369 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1966)
(cross-claims).
99. 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
100. See, e.g., Pipeliners Local Union No. 798 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1974);
Mayer Paving & Asphalt Co. v. General Dynamics Corp., 486 F.2d 763 (7th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1146 (1974); Union Paving Co. v. Downer Corp., 276 F.2d 468 (9th
Cir. 1960); Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944).
101. 270 U.S. at 610.
102. The flexible definition of "transaction" had its roots in Federal Equity Rule 30,
226 U.S. 627, 657 (1912).
103. See FED. R Crv. P. 13(a), (b).
104. FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a)
105. Tolson v. Hodge, 411 F.2d 123 (4th Cir. 1969); Mesker Bros. Iron. Co. v. Donata
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missive counterclaims are all other counterclaims, namely, those
"not arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the sub10 6
ject matter of the opposing party's claims."
Consistent with Moore, cases interpreting rule 13 have found
ancillary jurisdiction over compulsory counterclaims, 10 7 but have
required an independent basis of jurisdiction for permissive
counterclaims. 10 8 Cases prior to Kroger applied this rule of construction to counterclaims raised by third-party defendants
against third-party plaintiffs, 10 9 and nothing in the Court's opinion in Kroger appears to dictate a different result. Ancillary
jurisdiction would thus be invoked by a defending party "haled
into court against his will," who is required by federal practice to
raise his claim or lose it.110 In the usual case, such a counterclaim will evince the kind of "logical dependence" that the Court
identified in Kroger."' Assertion of ancillary jurisdiction in such
a context will generally result in a net savings in terms of judicial economy and convenience.
Cross-claims against co-third-party defendants are likewise
governed by rule 13.112 Subsection (g) of rule 13 allows, but does
not require, such a claim to be asserted when it arises "out of the
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the original action." 1 3 As the similar language in rules 13(g) and 13(a)
governing compulsory counterclaims might suggest, a proper

Corp., 401 F.2d 275 (4th Cir. 1968); New Britain Mach. Co. v. Yeo, 358 F.2d 397 (6th Cir.
1966); National Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Fowler, 287 F.2d 43 (2d Cir. 1961). This rule is a
well-established one; however, it is not a part of the rule 13 language. For a discussion of
probable sources and authorities for the rule, see C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 94,
§ 1417.

106. Fed. R. Civ. P. 13(b).
107. See, e.g., United States ex rel. D'Agostino Excavators, Inc. v. Heyward-Robinson
Co., 430 F.2d 1077 (2d Cir. 1970). The accepted view is that of the Third Circuit that "the
issue of the existence of ancillary jurisdiction and the issue as to whether a counterclaim
is compulsory are to be answered by the same test." Great Lakes Rubber Corp. v. Herbert
Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631, 633 (3d Cir. 1961).

108. See, e.g., Chance v. County Bd. of School Trustees, 332 F.2d 971 (7th Cir. 1964);
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Sales, Inc. v. Ralston Steel Corp., 25 F.R.D. 23 (N.D. Ill. 1959).
109. See, e.g., Weber v. Weber, 44 F.R.D. 227 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
110. 437 U.S. at 376.
111. Id.
112. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g) provides in part:
A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against a coparty arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter
either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein or relating to any prop-

erty that is the subject matter of the original action.
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cross-claim under rule 13(g) is generally held to be within the
ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts, at least when the
party asserting it is a defending party. 114 This result, for the
same reasons that federal courts assert ancillary jurisdiction
over compulsory counterclaims, should continue to be valid after
Kroger.115
Third-PartyDefendant v. OriginalPlaintiff
Rule 14(a) permits a third-party defendant to assert any claim
against the original plaintiff "arising out of the transaction or
occurrence that is the subject matter of the plaintiffs claim
against the third-party plaintiff."1 16 While this provision is very
similar to the rule 13(a) compulsory counterclaim provision, it is
expressly made permissive, to be asserted at the third-party's
option, and is neither a counterclaim nor a cross-claim. 117
The early cases interpreting rule 14(a) refused to allow such a
claim by the third party against the plaintiffl' 8 out of concern
that to do so would promote collusion. Although the 1948 amendments to the rule expressly authorized such a claim,11 9 the courts'
early reluctance colored their decisions regarding application of
the rule and the assertion of ancillary jurisdiction. 120 That reluctance manifested itself in narrow interpretations of the standard
for the "transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
plaintiffs claim against the third party plaintiff."'12 Some cases

114. See, e.g., LASA Per L'Industria Del Marmo Societa Per Azioni v. Alexander, 414
F.2d 143 (6th Cir. 1969); Scott v. Fancher, 369 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1966); Glen Falls Indem.
Co. v. United States ex rel. Westinghouse Elec. Supply Co., 229 F.2d 370 (9th Cir. 1955).
115. Moreover, cross-claims were one of several joinder provisions over which prior
cases had granted ancillary jurisdiction and which were cited with approval by the
Kroger majority. 437 U.S. at 375 n.18.
116. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a).
117. See WRIGHT, supra note 22, §§ 1444,1458.
118. See, e.g., Morris, Wheeler & Co., v. Rust Eng'r Co., 4 F.R.D. 307 (D. Del. 1945)
(claim by Pennsylvania third-party defendant against Pennsylvania plaintiff not ancillary to plaintiffs contract claim against Delaware defendant).
119. See 1947 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2295.
120. See supranote 36.
121. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). See, e.g., Finkel v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 333 (S.D.N.Y.
1974) (claim by third-party defendant against plaintiff alleging responsibility for corporate tax not ancillary to plaintiffs claim against government to cancel tax); Brown v.
First Nat'l Bank, 14 F.R.D. 339 (E.D. Okla. 1953) (claim for acounting by third-party
defendant against plaintiff was not ancillary to plaintiffs claim against bank for payment of funds in violation of escrow agreement).
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held that even though such a claim met the rule 14(a) standard
and was a validly stated claim, it failed to satisfy the ancillary
jurisdiction requirements of the federal courts. 122 These cases are
certainly difficult to reconcile with the drafters' apparent intention to parallel the language of rules 13(a) and 13(g), and thereby
include 13(g) claims within the scope of ancillary jurisdiction as
123
established by the Supreme Court in Moore.
The leading and perhaps best-reasoned case allowing a thirdparty claim against a plaintiff to fall within the ancillary jurisdiction of the federal courts is Revere Copper & Brass, Inc. v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 124 decided before Kroger. Revere
and Fuller had entered into a contract whereby Fuller was to
supply materials for the construction of a plant to be operated by
Revere. Aetna, as surety for Fuller, was obligated to pay Revere
any damages resulting from Fuller's failure to perform. Revere
sued Aetna on the surety bonds for damages of over $2,000,000,
alleging Fuller's breach of warranties, negligence and failure to
maintain a competent staff.125 Aetna impleaded Fuller alleging
an agreement to indemnify, and Fuller brought a claim against
Revere alleging breach of warranty, misrepresentation, negligence and Revere's unjust enrichment in the amount of
$1,328,880.126 Inasmuch as the third-party defendant, Fuller, and
the plaintiff, Revere, were both citizens of Maryland, no independent basis of jurisdiction existed over Fuller's claim. 127
In determining whether the court could assert ancillary jurisdiction over the claim, the Fifth Circuit first rejected any kind of
"mutuality" notion that because no ancillary jurisdiction existed
over a plaintiffs claim against a nondiverse third-party, the

122. See, e.g., Stahl v. Ohio River Co., 424 F.2d 52 (3d Cir. 1970) (allowable contingent
claim by third-party defendant may be asserted only against a person not a party to
proceeding).
123. The cases prior to Kroger divided on the ancillary jurisdiction question. Compare
James King & Son, Inc. v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 178 F. Supp. 146 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) with
James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
940 (1971).
124. 426 F.2d 709 (5th Cir. 1970). See Comment, Federal Rules of Civil ProcedureAncillary Jurisdiction-Third-PartyDefendant's Counterclaim Against Plaintiff Without
an IndpendentBasis of Federal Jurisdiction,59 Ky. L.J. 506 (1970); Note, Civil ProcedureAncillary Jurisdiction-The Third-PartyDefendant's Claim Under Rule 14(a), 49 N.C.L.
REV. 503 (1971); Comment, A Third Party Defendant's Claim Against Plaintiff Upheld
Despite Absence of IndependentJurisdictionalGrounds, 1970 WASH. U.LQ. 511.
125. 426 F.2d at 710.
126. Id. at 711.
127. Id.

1983]

Ancillary Jurisdiction

437

reverse should also be true. 128 More importantly, however, the
court attempted to formulate criteria for determining whether
ancillary jurisdiction exists in any given case by evaluating the
logical relationship between the third-party claim and the origi-

nal claim. The court stated that a logical relationship exists
where both claims arise out of the same aggregate of operative
facts. 129 This logical relationship forms the basis for asserting

ancillary jurisdiction. In Revere, because Aetna was a surety for
the contract at issue, a logical relationship existed between
Fuller's claim against Revere and Revere's claim against Aetna.
Thus, assertion of ancillary jurisdiction over Fuller's claim
accorded with both the pre-rules doctrine and rule 82.130
Subsequent courts agreed with the Fifth Circuit's reasoning in
finding claims by the third-party defendant against the original
plaintiff to be within the ancillary jurisdiction of the district
courts. 131 Following Kroger, however, at least one commentator
found that it "is in the area of a claim by the third-party back
against the plaintiff that the impact of Kroger is most uncertain."'132 Yet the invalidity of such a claim does not seem to follow logically from Kroger. Rather, the logic of the Revere court
that a third-party's claim against a plaintiff does not present the
risk of collusion with which the Court in Kroger seemed concerned is still persuasive. Nor is there any other strong policy
reason for denying the third-party defendant the opportunity to
raise his claim.

128.

The court stated:
Suffice it to say that the two situations are the converse of each other only
superficially and that there are differences which militate against identical
treatment. First of all, the plaintiff has the option of selecting the forum where
he believes he can most effectively assert his claim, he has not been involuntarily brought to a forum, faced with the prospect of defending himself as best he
can ....Moreover, there is the possibility, whether real or fanciful, of collusion
between the plaintiff and an overly cooperative defendant impleading just the
right third party.
Id. at 716.
129. Id. at 715 (provided "that the same aggregate [is] the basis of both claims; or (2)
that [the claim and the original aggregate of facts] activate additional legal rights in a
party defendant that would otherwise remain dormant.").
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., Union Bank & Trust Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 38 F.R.D.
486 (D.C. Neb. 1965); Heintz & Co. v. Provident Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co., 30 F.R.D.
171 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
132. Brill, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 14 and Ancillary Jurisdiction,59 NEB. L.
REV. 631, 668 (1980); see also Berch, The Erectionof a BarrierAgainst Assertion of Ancillary Claims: An Examination of Owen Equipment and Erection Company v. Kroger,
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In one post-Kroger case, 3 3 the court found that although the
plaintiff could not have brought an action originally against the
third-party defendant in the absence of a federal question or
diversity of citizenship, nor made a claim against him after he
had been impleaded,13 4 the third-party defendant need not be
similarly curtailed.1 3 5 After all, the plaintiff controls the choice
of forum in the first instance and may choose the most effective
court for litigating his claims. The third-party defendant, on the
other hand, is an involuntary litigant "who should not be
saddled with rules that inhibit him from effectively defending

himself."' 136 Kroger was concerned with collusion and subversion of the complete diversity requirement. Such concerns, however, are not relevant to a third party's claim against a plaintiff,
and consequently, no narrowing of ancillary jurisdiction should
take place in this regard.
Plaintiffv. Third-PartyDefendant

Rule 14(a) allows a plaintiff to bring any claims which he may
have against a properly impleaded third-party defendant arising
out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of
plaintiffs original claim against the defendant.1 3 7 The majority
of courts addressing this issue before 1978 required an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction for such a claim. 138 Thus,
the Supreme Court's conclusion in Kroger was not a surprising
one. What was surprising about the decision, however, was its

1979 ARIz. ST. L.J. 253.
133. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Aetna Life and Casualty Co., No. 80 C 0787, slip
op. (N.D. 111. Nov. 9, 1981) (available Dec. 1, 1982 on LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file).

134. In FirstFederal,the Savings & Loan sued Aetna seeking a declaratory judgment
that Aetna was liable on a blanket bond for losses sustained through the misconduct of
First Federal's former vice-president. Aetna impleaded Harris, the vice-president. Harris
filed a claim against First Federal for libel and slander. First Federal sought to have the
court dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction. Id. at 1-2.
135. Id. at 4.
136. Id.
137. FED. R. CIv. P. 14(a).
138. See, e.g., Fawvor v. Texaco, Inc., 546 F.2d 636 (5th Cir. 1977); Johnson v. Better
Materials Corp., 556 F.2d 131 (3d Cir. 1976); Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 533 F.2d 325 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Kenrose Mfg. Co. v. Fred Whitaker Co., 512 F.2d 890 (4th
Cir. 1972). Only the Eighth Circuit had consistently adopted the opposite view. See, e.g.,
Kroger v. Owen Equip. & Erection Co., 558 F.2d 417 (8th Cir. 1977); Morgan v. Serro
Travel Trailer Co., 69 F.R.D. 697 (D. Kan. 1975); Olson v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 489 (D.
Neb. 1965).
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inflexibility. 1 39 By holding in its broadest language that "neither
the convenience of litigants nor considerations of judicial economy can suffice to justify extension of the doctrine of ancillary
jurisdiction to a plaintiffs cause of action against a citizen of the
same State in a diversity case,"' 140 the Court failed to leave itself
or the lower courts the maneuvering room available in earlier
cases. Instead, the Court suggested there were no instances in
which a plaintiff might proceed against a third-party without an
independent basis of jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, several possible exceptions to the rigid rule of
4
Kroger have been suggested by courts and commentators.1 '
42
First, the Supreme Court itself suggested in Aldinger v. Howard
that were it presented with a case in which no forum other than
a federal one existed wherein all related claims might be heard,
it might reach a different result. 43 Such a case might arise
because of personal jurisdiction or venue limitations which prevent a plaintiff from suing all defendants in a state court, 144 or
where the main claim is one over which the federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction. In the latter instance, a plaintiff would not
in fact have the option of bringing all his claims together in
state court. 145 While legitimate reasons seem to exist in such
cases for allowing a district court to assert ancillary jurisdiction
over the nonfederal claims involved, post-Krogerdecisions have shown
146
little inclination to bend the rule.
Finally, one claim by a plaintiff against a third-party defendant which has yet to be addressed decisively by the courts is that
asserted by a plaintiff in response to a claim by a third-party
defendant, a claim analogous to a compulsory counterclaim. 47
Should such a claim fall within the ancillary jurisdiction of the
courts or be barred by the Kroger rationale? Read most rigidly,

139. See generally Berch, supra note 132.
140. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 377.
141. See, e.g., Baker, Towards a Relaxed View of Federal Ancillary and Pendent
Jurisdiction,33 U. PITr. L. REv. 759, 775 (1972); Brill, supra note 132, at 670-77; Comment,
supra note 28, at 1284.
142. 427 U.S. 1 (1976). See supra notes 78-82 and accompanying text.
143. 427 U.S. at 18.
144. See, e.g., Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 390 F. Supp. 45 (N.D. Ohio 1975).
145. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
146. See Action Co. v. Bachman Foods, Inc., 668 F.2d 76 (1st Cir. 1982); Gud T.
Handge & Son Painting Co. v. Douglass State Bank, 543 F. Supp. 374 (D.C. Kan. 1982).
But see Ortiz v. United States, 595 F.2d 65 (1st Cir. 1979).
147. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), 14(a).
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Kroger seems to prohibit ancillary jurisdiction over any claim by
a plaintiff against a third party. However, there are several reasons why this claim should fall outside the rule of Kroger.
First, the fear of collusion is lessened by the nature of the
responsive claim. However real the Court's perceived risk of collusion may be, that a plaintiff would sue a nondiverse party,
hope for impleader and then wait for a claim by the third-party
defendant as a means of circumventing the complete diversity
requirement seems less than credible. A plaintiff in such a position has no certainty of obtaining a desired result and no way to
compel one. Second, practical considerations of judicial economy,
convenience and fairness to the parties loom large in such a setting. Not only does it make sense to hear the related claims in
one forum, but a plaintiff may be compelled to bring his related

"counterclaim" or risk losing

it.148

Fairness would therefore

seem to require a judicially-created exception to the "compulsory" feature of such "counterclaims." Most significant, however,
is that the plaintiff, at the point when he raises his responsive
claim, takes the position of defending party. Such a change in
position has been recognized in other contexts 149 and should be
recognized here, with the result that Kroger's rule not be strictly
applied.150
SUGGESTED APPROACH
The Supreme Court has left unanswered the question of
whether a district court may ever assert ancillary jurisdiction
over a plaintiff s claim against a third-party defendant. In resolving this issue in light of Aldinger and Kroger, the lower courts
should take a reasoned approach which incorporates not only
the rules of those cases, but the principles traditionally supporting the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction.
If a plaintiff asserts a claim against a third-party defendant,
assuming a relationship which satisfies constitutional require-

148.
149.
P. 13(g)
against
150.
1980).

See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Danner v. Anskis, 256 F.2d 123 (3d Cir. 1958) (interpreting FED. R CIV.
to require a plaintiff to be in a defensive position before he may file a cross-claim
a co-plaintiff).
Accord Hyman-Michaels Co. v. Swiss Bank Corp., 496 F. Supp. 663 (N.D. Ill.
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ments exists, the court should first examine that claim in light of
Aldinger; that is, the court should determine whether the plaintiffs claim is one which Congress has clearly intended should
not be brought in the federal courts. 151 Where this specific congressional intent exists, the district court should not take ancillary jurisdiction over the claim. In addition to specific statutory
limitations, the general diversity requirement might bar a plaintiffs claim against a third-party defendant. 152 However, as the
Court in Kroger acknowledged, the complete diversity requirement is not an absolute bar to assertions of ancillary jurisdiction
153
given certain policy considerations.
A court must, therefore, balance several other factors against
the diversity requirement. First, the court should consider whether
judicial economy and convenience will be served by hearing all
related claims in one case. This factor would encompass determinations of how strongly related the plaintiffs claim against
the third-party defendant is to the primary claim, and perhaps
its relationship, if any, to the third-party plaintiff's claim against
the third-party defendant. Second, the court should consider the
fairness to the litigants of requiring separate suits. Third, the
court should determine the availability of another forum in
which all the claims might be heard together. Fourth, the court
should consider the jurisdictional basis of the primary claim. Is
it a federal question case? If so, the federal court might be more
willing to exert ancillary jurisdiction over a related state claim,
so as to encourage the bringing of federal questions in federal
court. Finally, the court should consider how strong the risk of
collusion really is in a given case or type of case. After weighing
all the factors, the court would be in a position to make a
rational determination as to whether the related claims constituted one case or controversy over which federal jurisdiction
should be asserted.
CONCLUSION

That the Kroger case has affected and will continue to affect
the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction cannot be denied. Its effect,
however, is not necessarily only a negative one. Kroger and subSee Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 16 (1976).
152. Kroger, 437 U.S. at 373-74.
153. Id. at 375.
151.
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sequent cases have left intact much of the post-rules approach to
ancillary jurisdiction. The Court has shown no inclination to
invalidate the expansion of the doctrine which has taken place
since 1938, despite rule 82. Consequently, federal courts continue
to recognize ancillary jurisdiction over third-party plaintiffs
claims against third-party defendants, and third-party defendant's claims against third-party plaintiffs, co-third-party defendants and the original plaintiff. Moreover, Kroger may have at
least two potentially positive consequences. One of these results
from the Court's acknowledgment that ancillary and pendent
jurisdictions are more similar than not, a move that will no
doubt contribute to a conscious merger of the two standards.
Second, by indicating that the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction
does in fact have outer limits, the Court will likely compel lower
courts to take a more reasoned approach to exercising such
jurisdiction. It is this reasoned approach which will enable the
courts to deal consistently and fairly with the remaining major
area of uncertainty: plaintiffs claims asserted against a nondiverse third-party defendant.

